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We aim here for a better understanding of the Japanese keiretsu. Our
essential claim is that to understand the Japanese system-banks with extensive
investment in industry and industry with extensive cross-ownership-we must

understand the problems of industrial organization, not just the problems of
corporate governance. The Japanese system, we assert, functions not only to

harmonize the relationships among the corporation, its shareholders, and its
senior managers, but also to facilitate productive efficiency.

Comparative corporate governance, once an academic backwater, now enjoys

important government and scholarly attention. U.S. government reports attribute
Japan's competitive success in part to features of the Japanese system.1 Harvard
Business School's major, multi-disciplinary study of American management's

1. See, e.g, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISION, REGULATION AND
INSURANCE, TASK FORCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF

THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING. FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, H.R. REP. No. 7, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
7-8, 66, 189-90, 193-94 (1990) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT] (Japanese "cross-shareholding arrangements

create real linkages with real advantages"; "the 'keiretsu' system [is] a very effective system designed to
maintain Japanese business competitiveness").
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time horizons recommends, as a way to combat "short-termism" among U.S.
managers, restructuring American corporate governance so that it resembles
Japan's more closely.2

This newfound interest derives from two changes, one domestic and one

international. The domestic change is evident in scholars' new understanding

of America's corporate governance system; during a short period of time, the
basic paradigm has shifted. The "traditional" model of American corporate
governance presented the Berle-Means corporation-characterized by a separation
of ownership and management resulting from the need of growing enterprises
for capital and the specialization of management-as the pinnacle in the

evolution of organizational forms. Given this model's dominance, the study of
comparative corporate governance was peripheral; governance systems differing
from the American paradigm were dismissed as mere intermediate steps on the

path to perfection, or as evolutionary dead-ends, the neanderthals of corporate
governance. Neither laggards nor dead-ends made compelling objects of study.
More recent scholarship challenges the "traditional" view, arguing that the
separation of ownership and management-and the absence of substantial

shareholders or lenders to monitor professional management-is historically
and politically contingent. In particular, in the United States, populism,

federalism, and interest group conflicts combined to restrict the growth of large
financial intermediaries, especially banks, and constrained other efforts to oversee
management, through a regulatory web of banking, insurance, tax, and securities

laws.3 The American system may be the product of an evolutionary process,
but its development has been affected by features of our politics, some of which
are fundamental to democracy, some peculiar to American democracy. Nothing
in that process assures the American system's productive superiority to systems
that evolved under different conditions.

The second change-heightened international competition-has made it
important to understand the contingency of American corporate governance.
The globalization of commerce and the postwar reemergence of the Japanese

and European economies has required American corporations to compete with
organizations having dramatically different governance systems. In this new
environment, competition exists not only among products, but also among
governance systems, and American firms are not always winning. Thus, real

world competition has obliged business scholarship to focus on comparative
corporate governance. Because the American system is now seen as contingent,

2. Michael Porter, Remarks at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Forum on Corporate
Governance and American Economic Competitiveness: The Role of Shareholders, Directors and Management
41-62 (Mar. 20, 1992) (transcript on file with authors).

3. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 10 (199 1)
[hereinafter Roe, A Political Theory]; Mark J. Roe, Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control
of Public Companies, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 7 (1990); Joseph A. Grundfest, Subordination of American Capital,

27 J. FIN. ECON. 89 (1990). See generally Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV.

Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61.
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and other systems seemed in the 1980's to be doing better, understanding the
differences has become urgent.4
Yet, we shall argue here, our system's characteristics color the lens through

which the first comparative studies viewed the rest of the world. Analysis of
American corporate governance has always sought to solve the problem of
separation of ownership and control: who will monitor management in light of

dispersed shareholdings. Favored candidates for this monitoring role have shifted
from outside directors5 to the market for corporate control, and, most recently,
to institutional investors. As a result, the primary focus in comparative studies
of Japanese corporate governance has been the role of the main bank. Conventional wisdom among American scholars has been that the Japanese system

solves the corporate governance problem-who monitors management-through
continuous monitoring by a financial intermediary, rather than through intermittent and often disruptive monitoring by capital markets.6 Relying on this

analysis, reform proposals have identified institutional investors as having the
potential to provide Japanese-style monitoring in the American system.7
To date, comparative analyses of the Japanese corporate governance system
have assumed that the central purpose of the Japanese system, like that of the

American system, is solving the Berle-Means monitoring problem. We argue
that the Japanese system serves a function in addition to the monitoring of

management. Our Japanese model reflects not only the need for corporate
governance, the traditional factor American scholars have identified as shaping
corporate structures, but also the need to support production and exchange-what

we will call contractual governance.8 To be sure, complex multi-level

monitoring is part of the production process, but this monitoring is motivate

not just by financial institutions seeking a return on capital, but also by prod

market competition. Bank monitoring thus should not be seen in isolation, bu
4. Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness, 46 Bus. LAW.

242-43 (1990); see sources cited supra notes 2-3.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 17-24.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 31-36.

7. See, e.g, Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice,
39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992) [hereinafter Black, Agents Watching Agents]; Bernard S. Black, The Value
of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895 (1992) [hereinafter
Black, Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring]; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the
Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991); Jensen, supra note

3.

8. While Carl Kester does not draw this distinction, his work, together with that of Professor Masahiko
Aoki, is unusual in its focus on the relationship between the production process and corporate governance.
See W. CARL KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS: THE GLOBAL CONTEST FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 53 (1991)
[hereinafter KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS] ("The overall effect of Japanese corporate governance is to
foster tremendous efficiencies in the execution of business transactions by making it easier to build and

maintain long-term relationships."); Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm,
28 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1 (1990) [hereinafter Aoki, Toward an Economic Model]; MASAHIKO AOKI, THE
JAPANESE FIRM AS A SYSTEM OF ATTRIBUTES: A SURVEY AND RESEARCH AGENDA (Center for Economic
Policy Research Working Paper No. 288, 1992) [hereinafter AoKI, A SYSTEM OF ATTRIBUTES]; W. CARL
KESTER, GOVERNANCE, CONTRACTING, AND INVESTMENT TIME HORIZONS (Harvard Business School Working

Paper No. 92-003, 1991) [hereinafter KESTER, GOVERNANCE].
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as one specific (although important) kind of a wide range of contractual

monitoring types in Japan. An empirical observation informs this perspective:
although financial institutions hold one-half of Japanese public firm stock, often
in highly-concentrated blocks, another quarter of Japanese stock is held by other
corporations, often suppliers or customers.9
Our claims are modest. We do not contend that our model fully describes

the Japanese system; we do not seek to displace the main-bank-as-monitor

paradigm. Indeed, we doubt that any single model fully captures the system's
complexity. Rather, we mean to show only that (1) our model captures an

important element missed thus far, and that (2) intermediary monitoring is only
one part of a larger Japanese system of contractual governance. We also do not
seek to discredit proposals that would reform American corporate governance

by enabling intermediaries to monitor management more effectively. The pathdependent development of the American Berle-Means corporation might well
indicate that intermediary monitoring is now the best solution for the American

corporation's deeper governance problems. But the broader contractual

governance structure characteristic of large Japanese firms, having taken anoth

evolutionary path, cannot be duplicated exactly in the United States by changin
only the role of financial intermediaries.10
Apart from the corporate governance debate, international trade issues

surround the keiretsu. Some Americans see keiretsu cross-ownership as an
anticompetitive, exclusionary structure, sufficient to make it a subject of bilateral

trade talks.1" Specifically, the U.S. Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) views
cross-ownership as a productive, yet exclusionary, device.

These two functions of cross-ownership-monitoring and producing-are
left unconnected in the literature. While we offer no comment on the specific

elements of the SII (in fact, the keiretsu structure's efficiency may be a source

of the exclusionary effects), academic theory would profit by seeing, as SII does,
keiretsu cross-ownership not only as a managerial monitoring mechanism but

as a productive structure as well. The bank-as-monitor theorists need to account
for cross-ownership among nonfinancial producers. The impediments theorists
must consider the potential organizational advantages arising from partial

cross-ownership among factors of production.12

9. Stephen D. Prowse, The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Japan, 48 J. FIN. 1121, 1123 (1992);
Yasaku Futatsugi, What Share Cross-Holdings Mean for Corporate Management, ECON. EYE, Spring 1990,
at 17, 18.

10. See Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Governance in Germany, Japan, and America,
102 YALE L.J. (forthcoming June 1993).

11. U.S. to Focus on "Keiretsu," Foreign Investment in 51, KYODo NEWS SERV., July 27, 1992
(reporting U.S. Treasury Dept. pressure on Japan to force keiretsu to become more "transparent" during
bilateral Structural Impediments Initiative talks), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Kyodo News Service
File; see also PAUL SHEARD, KEIRETSU AND CLOSEDNESS OF THE JAPANESE MARKET: AN ECONOMIC
APPRAISAL (Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University Discussion Paper No. 273, 1992)
(economic analysis of claim that keiretsu is exclusionary).
12. We are quite conscious that our theory here parallels antitrust developments in the 1960's and 1970's.
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In Part I, we sketch the development of the traditional Berle-Means

conception of American corporate governance and the succession of potenti

monitors that have led to a comparative focus on Japan. In Part II, we brief

summarize the dominant theme of current comparative analysis of Japanes
corporate governance: the monitoring role of the main bank. In Part III, we set

out our contractual governance model of the Japanese corporate system, and

in Part IV, we explore the model's implications both for comparative corpor

governance analysis of the Japanese system and for reforming America's
corporate governance system.

I. THE BERLE-MEANS MODEL OF AMERICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means announced the separation of

ownership and control in American industry. The Modern Corporation and
Private Property,13 a book that for some sixty years has defined the intellectual

mission of American corporate governance, reported that owners of major
corporations had become atomistic shareholders lacking the ability, skill,
information, and often the incentives to monitor the performance of specialized

managers."4 Thereafter, the corporate governance debate became a search for
the organizational Holy Grail: a mechanism to bridge the separation of ownership

and control by holding managers accountable for their performance.

The modern corporate governance literature has treated this separation as
the efficient response to economic forces. Specialization of risk bearing increased

the availability of capital by opening investment to individuals who would not

be active in the firm's operations, and reduced the cost of capital by allowing

diversification." Efficiency became the standard in the corporate governance
debate. To increase the value of the corporation, control is delegated to managers

with specialized skills. But this delegation also gives managers the discretion
to advance their own agenda at the shareholders' expense. The purpose of
corporate governance, thus, became minimizing the sum of the costs involved
in aligning managers and shareholders' incentives and in unavoidable selfinterested managerial behavior."6

During that period, the U.S. government attacked partial vertical integration-not unlike that of the
keiretsu-on the assumption that, absent clearly efficient motives and effects, the structures must have been

exclusionary. Theorists, and finally courts, later came to view many of these structures as more efficient
than exclusionary. See Roe, supra note 10.
13. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

(1933).

14. Id. at 47-68.

15. Alfred Chandler argues that the increasing complexity of business was a more important cause of
separation than the dispersion of stock holdings. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE
DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 232 (1990). Existing owners lacked the skills and information
necessary either to run modern corporations themselves or to monitor the decisions of those who did. Id.
16. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).

This content downloaded from 140.247.230.88 on Mon, 20 Mar 2017 20:19:52 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

1993] Understanding Keiretsu Overlaps 877

The most enduring institution for minimizing agency cost has been the
independent director. The concept-that shareholders would bridge their
separation from managers by electing nonemployee directors to monitor
management performance-has reached the status of conventional wisdom. The

Business Roundtable,17 the Conference Board,18 the American Bar Associa-

tion,'9 the American Law Institute,20 and the Delaware courts21 have all come

to accord independent directors the primary monitoring role. Substantial doubt

remains, however, as to independent directors' effectiveness. They typically are
chosen by management and perceive themselves as "serving at the pleasure of

the CEO-Chairman."22 In addition, most are chief executive officers of other

large companies23 who are unlikely to monitor more energetically than they
would want to be monitored by their own boards.24
Hostile takeovers during the late 1970's and 1980's provided another
technique for minimizing agency costs. Here the external monitor-the
market-replaced the internal monitor. When the market price of a company's

stock signalled poor managerial performance, those who thought they could do
better paid the shareholders a premium-reflecting some sharing of the potential

gain-for the privilege of improving the target company's performance. But
owing in no small part to the discretion that the Delaware courts and other states'
legislatures gave target management, takeovers grew more expensive, and some

states made many takeovers too costly to attempt.25 Moreover, takeovers were
reactive at best: they attacked much bad management but did not directly prevent
it. Finally, at least the 1980's generation of takeovers depended on debt

financing, which dried up at the beginning of the 1990's. Many such takeovers

17. See Business Roundtable, supra note 4, at 247-48; Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition
of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2108 (1978) ("We
note the strong tendency of U.S. business corporations to move toward a board structure based on a majority
of outside directors-and we endorse it.").

18. See JEREMY BACON & JAMES K. BROWN, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP
PRACTICES: ROLE, SELECTION AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE BOARD (1975).

19. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking & Business Law, American
Bar Association, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1619-21 (1978).
20. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ? 3A.01 (Proposed Final Draft 1992).

21. The Delaware courts have assigned special weight to outside directors' decisions. See Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (finding merger failed fairness test where feasibility study not shown

to outside directors); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (dismissing derivative suits
where self-interested board members delegated litigation decision to independent committee of disinterested

board members); William T. Allen, Independent Directors In MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or Fantasy?,
45 Bus. LAW. 2055 (1990) (arguing that special committees of outside directors may, if used properly, protect

shareholder interests) (Allen is Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery).
22. JAY W. LoRScH, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 17
(1989).

23. Id. at 18 (63% of outside directors are CEO's of other companies).
24. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 872-76 (analyzing failings of outside director
concept).

25. See Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics, in THE DEAL DECADE (Margaret Blair ed., forthcoming 1993
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have resulted in costly recapitalizations, often in Chapter 11. By 1992, the market
for corporate control was quiet.

The takeover market's decline coincided with a realization among commentators that perhaps the premise underlying the Berle and Means analysis no longer
held. While no one was looking, shareholders had reaggregated somewhat;
institutional investors held half the stock of the largest American corporations,

although in small blocks.26 The blocks were never as concentrated as those
now found in Japan, but the number of players was often sufficiently small so
that concerted investor action could be considered-or at least prescribed by
academics. While a takeover's governance benefits rested on an outsider buying
enough stock to become a large stockholder, the new aggregation raised the
possibility that existing large stockholders could provide those benefits without
takeovers. Some institutions-usually public pension funds-began to act
somewhat like monitors, making proposals concerning takeover defenses,
shareholder advisory committees, and director independence.27 Emboldened
by this activity, reformers even suggested that institutional investors had the

power to make the outside director concept viable,28 or to set forth the changes
necessary to make it viable.29
Once it became clear (1) that the Berle-Means corporation was historically
and politically contingent and (2) that intermediaries could play a role, other
patterns of corporate governance became plausible alternatives, including foreign
patterns in which intermediaries have long played a more important role than

they have played in the United States.30 Foreign structures no longer seem to
be laggards struggling to catch up to America's advanced capital markets;
instead, they have become alternatives to our own structures. Even if we would

never use the foreign structures as a blueprint for American reform, they might
help us chart a new course for the large American public corporation.

26. Carolyn Kay Brancato, The Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors in Capital Markets, in
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING: THE CHALLENGES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE 21ST CENTURY 3, 21, Table

1-7 (Arnold W. Sametz ed., 1991); Carolyn Kay Brancato, Institutional Investors and Capital Markets: 1991
Update 18 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
27. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 867-76 (reviewing strategies).

28. See id.; see also Ronald J. Gilson, Lilli A. Gordon & John Pound, How the Proxy Rules Discourage
Constructive Engagement: Regulatory Barriers to Electing a Minority of Directors, 17 J. CORP. L. 29, 30-34
(1992).

29. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990)
(reviewing regulatory barriers to institutional shareholders actively participating in corporate governance);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 1277 (1991) (asserting those seeking influence should forego liquidity). As Louis Lowenstein points
out, index funds, with tiny management fees of two basis points, lack the resources to monitor. Louis
LOWENSTEIN, SENSE AND NONSENSE IN CORPORATE FINANCE 220 (1991). They are the ultimate Berle-Means
free riders, capable of acting but depending on others to monitor for them.

30. This argument parallels a similar one made by Michael Piore and Charles Sabel that the American
system of industrial organization is historically and politically contingent. MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES
F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY 19-48 (1984). The parallel is
especially interesting in light of our suggestion that the Japanese system can be understood as one of industrial
organization as much as corporate governance. See infra Part IIL.
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II. THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK AS THE MISSING MONITOR

Japan, it appeared, had developed a solution to the Berle-Means monitoring
problem: the main bank. A Japanese corporation had a single bank that provided

the largest share of its borrowings and also held a substantial equity position.31
Moreover, the main bank spoke with more than its own authority. Each main

bank seemed to act as the delegated monitor for other banks lending to its client

corporation, so that, in effect, the creditors spoke with a single voice.32 The
main bank required review of a client corporation's business plans33 and, in
the event of poor performance, intervened to impose new management or

strategies. It often bailed out a troubled company.34 Thus, the main bank was
said to provide "an important substitute mechanism for what in effect is a

'missing' takeover market in Japan; or to put it somewhat differently the main

bank system serves to internalize the market for corporate control."35
It is hardly surprising that American commentators were drawn to this picture

of a monitoring paragon;36 the Japanese main bank confirmed the historical
and political contingency of American arrangements. American political history
prevented American financial intermediaries from directly monitoring management.37 America never had widespread main banks, but where financial
intermediaries were not so severely limited, as in Japan, they helped bridge the
separation of ownership and management.

31. See, e.g., Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and Control in Japan,
11 J. Ec()N. BEHAV. & ORG. 399 (1989). Sheard reports that for corporations listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange, the main bank was the largest or second largest shareholder in 39% of the cases in his sample
and among the top five shareholders in 72% of the cases. Id. at 402. Similarly, a recent study reports that
a Japanese corporation's largest lender owned on average 6.2% of equity, its five largest lenders owned
on average 18.2% of equity, and in 57 of the 133 sample corporations, the largest lender was the largest
shareholder. Stephen D. Prowse, Institutional Investment Patterns and Corporate Financial Behavior in the
United States and Japan, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 43, 46-47 (1990).
32. See Sheard, supra note 31, at 401-03; PAUL SHEARD, DELEGATED MONITORING AMONG DELEGATED
MONITORS: PRINCIPAL-AGENT ASPECTS OF THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM (Australian National
University and Osaka University Working Paper, 1992). Such a cooperative allocation of monitoring
responsibility minimizes duplication and, because other banks act as first-line monitors with respect to other
companies, reduces incentives to free ride.

33. "In a 'good' main bank relationship, the firm will consult the bank closely when drawing up its
business plans and will provide regular reports on its performance." Sheard, supra note 31, at 403.
34. See, e.g., Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, The Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs
of Financial Distress in Japan, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 67 (1990). For descriptions of active main bank intervention
in crises, see KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS, supra note 8, at 70-73; Paul Sheard, The Economics of
Interlocking Shareholding in Japan, 45 RICERCHE ECONOMICHE 421, 436-38 (1991).
35. Sheard, supra note 31, at 407.

36. For example, Michael Jensen stressed that "LBO partnerships play a dual funding and oversight
role that is similar in many ways to that of the main banks in the Japanese keiretsu." Michael C. Jensen,
Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1991, at 13, 22. Gilson
and Kraakman stated the corporate governance challenge as designing "a new structure that duplicates the
monitoring capabilities of the LBO and [Japanese] banker models." Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 7, at
879. We return to Jensen's comparative analysis of the LBO association later. See infra text accompanying
notes 109-118.

37. See Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 3.
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The standard Japanese bank monitoring st

respects. To the extent that a monopoly contro

was critical to their power, the rise of alternat

of corporate retained earnings diminished it

as stockholders-might still intervene in the eve
even if normally passive, might motivate managers to avoid a crisis, crisis
intervention is a more limited role than that of an ongoing monitor of business
strategy. The primary active role of the banks' large stockholdings would not
be to improve normal corporate governance before crisis-the primary American
goal-but to facilitate financial and managerial restructuring when big problems
arose-an important but secondary American goal.
Second, characterizations of the main bank as "internaliz[ing] the market

for corporate control"40 need clarification. Displacing inefficient management-management that is performing so poorly as to threaten the corporation's
economic viability-is one function of takeovers. But it is neither the only
function41 nor, over lengthy periods, necessarily the most important one. During
the 1980's, the dominant acquisition motive appears not to have been to remove
management whose operational performance threatened to bankrupt the company,
3X. Kester tells us:

Financial managers at manufacturing companies generally concur with this description of the
[lessening] degree of monitoring and control exerted over their companies by their traditional
main banks. Whereas all but one of the companies in the field sample indicated that their corporate
plans and investments were closely examined by banks during the 1950-1980 period, none reported
being subject to such scrutiny today. Although meetings with lenders are still held semi-annually
or at least annually to discuss performance, these have apparently evolved into largely perfunctory
presentations of past performance rather than substantive discussions of future capital investment.

KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS, supra note 8, at 197. Other commentators offer similar observations. See
e.g., JAMES C. ABEGGLEN & GEORGE STALK, JR., KAISHA, THE JAPANESE CORPORATION 189 (1985) ("Th
conclusion is that dependence on a bank is no more to the liking of Japanese management than managemen
in other countries, and for leading Japanese companies no longer a significant issue."); J. Mark Ramseyer,
Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Defection in Japan, 20 J. LEG. STUD. 91, 98 (1991
Available data show a decreased role for banks. In the early 1970's, listed Japanese companies generated
internally only 36% of their net increase in funds; by the early 1980's, internally generated funds accounted
for 71 % of the increase. The data with respect to bank borrowings are consistent. In the early 1970's, 41 %
of the net increase in funds came from bank borrowings. By the mid-1980's, the bank share had droppe

to 6%. Paul Sheard, Japanese Corporate Finance and Behaviour: Recent Developments and the Impact o
Deregulation, in JAPANESE FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE ROLE OF THE YEN 55, 56 (Colin McKenzie &
Michael Stutchbery eds., 1992). A slowing Japanese economy may well lead industrial firms short of cash

to restore main bank relationships.

39. Professor Aoki states: "In the normal course of events ... the main bank exercises explicit control
neither in the selection of management nor in corporate policy making." Aoki, Toward an Economic Model
supra note 8, at 14 (emphasis added). "Financial control by bank cum stockholders concerning corporate
direction is exercised only in a business crisis." Id. at 16.
40. Sheard, supra note 31, at 407.

41. For efforts to identify what proportion of hostile takeovers are made to displace inefficient
management as opposed to synergy or other strategies, see, e.g., Kenneth Martin & John McConnell,
Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover, 46 J. FIN. 671 (1991); Randall
Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Alterative Mechanisms for Corporate Control, 79 AM. ECON.
REv. 842 (1989); Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Characteristics of Targets of Hostile
and Friendly Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 101 (Alan J. Auerbach
ed., 1988); see also RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE

ACQUISITIONS: 1991 SuPP. 37-86 (1991) (summarizing literature).
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but instead to dismantle ineffective conglomerates t

continuing to throw away their free cash flow.42
in using an unwieldy structure, but once the (bad

keep the structure and invest free cash flow in it, t

be done. The prototypical target was RJR Nabisco, n

main bank has served thus far primarily as a crisis m

and gatekeeper to bankruptcy, it has not yet sho
substitute for America's 1980's takeovers. A comp

reduce poor use of free cash flow, a problem Jap
True, the existence of large blocks of stock whos
of crisis) could improve senior managers' incentives

with large blocks of stock and (sometimes still) large

as requiring intervention before there is as much or

induce a Chapter 11 proceeding. Even the new re
might provide a useful model.

Moreover, our point is not to criticize the limits of the Japanese main bank

system. Indeed, the very limits are said by Professors Aoki and Sheard to be
central to the system's genius. The limits allow managers freedom from outside

pressure except in crisis so that they can respect commitments to employees.
In times of crisis, the main bank provides a safety net-the funds and expertise

to bail the employees out-although at some personal cost to the employees
and with some positive probability of liquidation. Avoiding bank intervention
gives both management and employees an incentive for team performance.43
Our point is instead that the Japanese corporate governance system is not

only about Berle-Means corporate governance. It also may be an effort to link
the structural features of the corporation directly to the efficiency of the

corporation's actual production; it is about industrial organization, not just
corporate governance. Viewing the Japanese system through Berle-Means
blinders, in the belief that it reflects only an effort to bridge the separation of
ownership and control, will cause us to misunderstand it and, as a result, to miss
the lessons that comparative analysis can offer.

Recent work by economists is consistent with a model of Japanese
contractual governance. Much of it has focused on the Japanese firms' ability
to provide incentives making the interests of owners and employees compatible
42. See Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return
to Corporate Specialization, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcONoMIc ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1 (Martin

N. Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1990); Amar Bhide, The Causes and Consequences of Hostile Takeovers,
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1989, at 36, 52 ("real source of gains in hostile takeovers lies in splitting
up diversified companies"); Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Do Managerial Objectives
Drive Bad Acquisitions?, 45 J. FIN. 31, 47 (1990) (evidence "that the source of bust-up gains in the 1980s
is the reversal of the unrelated diversification of the 1960s and the 1970s").

43. See Aoki, Toward an Economic Model, supra note 8, at 14-15; Masahiko Aoki, Ex Post Monitoring
by the Main Bank (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) [hereinafter Aoki, Ex Post
Monitoring]; Masahiko Aoki & Paul Sheard, The Role of the Japanese Main Bank in the Corporate

Governance Structure in Japan (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
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and on enforcing implicit contracts among related firms.44 In the next Part,
we seek to extend this work by explaining the keiretsu as a form of industrial
organization motivated by the need to support multilateral relation-specific

investment. Then we explore the circumstances, notably competition in the

product market, under which such an organization can flourish.
III. THE JAPANESE SYSTEM AS GLOBAL CONTRACTUAL GOVERNANCE
OF WHICH SPECIFIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IS A SUBSET
One-third of Japanese corporate cross-holdings is not held by financial

institutions, but by industrial companies, which are often suppliers or customers

of the portfolio company.45 What is the function of this one-third of the
cross-holdings? Can the Japanese system be partly understood as a form of
industrial organization, as a means to integrate customers and suppliers, different
pieces in the production process, of which capital suppliers are only one
component? In this Part, we develop a simple model of the Japanese system
in which cross-ownership's primary purpose is to foster efficient production,
not directly to provide monitoring by the residual equity holder. The inquiry

here focuses less on corporate governance than on industrial organization.46
Two introductory points should be made, one substantive and one method-

ological. The substantive point is that we take as the Japanese structure not a
single Japanese corporation in isolation, but the keiretsu structure-the

interlocking webs of firms, which loom so large in the Japanese economy.47
44. Professor Aoki may be the most explicit in identifying these links. Concentrating on the structure

of a single corporation, his three Duality principles-between a firm's coordination and incentive modes,
its decision hierarchy and incentive-ranking hierarchy, and the interests of ownership and employees-link
the Japanese corporation's success to a particular economic environment and a particular type of production.
AoKI, A SYSTEM OF ATTRIBUTES, supra note 8, at 10-20. See KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS, supra note
8, at 53-82 (treating, most ambitiously, overall structure of keiretsu as designed to support exchange among
member corporations, as system of contractual, not corporate, governance); KESTER, GOVERNANCE, supra
note 8, at 14-31 (same); GERALD T. GARVEY & PETER L. SWAN, THE INTERACTION BETWEEN FINANCIAL
AND EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: A FORMAL MODEL OF JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Australian
Graduate School of Management, University of New South Wales Working Paper, 1991) (linking main bank
and keiretsu cross-holding features of Japanese system to structure of employee incentives); PAUL SHEARD,
THE ECONOMICS OF INTERLOCKING SHAREHOLDINGS IN JAPAN 21-22 (Center for Economic Policy Research,

Stanford University Working Paper No. 259, 1991); Erik Berglof & Enrico Perotti, The Japanese Keiretsu
as a Collective Enforcement Mechanism (Jan. 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (modeling
keiretsu as technique for enforcement of implicit contracts among member firms).
45. Futatsugi, supra note 9, at 17, 18.

46. Traditional theory of the firm was not a theory of the firm at all, but rather described how firms
behaved under different competitive conditions. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA

386 (1937); R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713 (1992) (Nobel
lecture). The firm itself remained a black box. An agency-based theory of the firm opened the box to find
a nexus of contracts. More recent comparative corporate governance scholarship seeks to move the analysis
down yet another level and examine how firm structure-the particular pattern of contracts whose nexus
is the firm-relates to the actual productive activities of the firm. Like the early physicists, we are finding
boxes within boxes.

47. While only one-tenth of 1% of Japanese corporations belong to a keiretsu, member firms account

for approximately one-quarter of total corporate sales and represent one-half of all listed Japanese corporations.
KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS, supra note 8, at 55.
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The study of American corporate governance concentrates on the structure of

a single firm, say, General Motors; a Japanese keiretsu may include the
equivalent of GM, GE, US Steel (now USX), and IBM, as separate firms. A
keiretsu might have a car assembler, a steel company (which supplies steel sheets
for cars and buys furnaces for its factories from the electrical machinery

company), and a computer firm (which supplies microprocessors for the cars,
appliances, machines, and factory).48 Each company would have some separate
existence, but through extensive cross-ownership,49 these quasi-firms would

blend at the edges. We take the entire structure-all these quasi-firms, in Japan,

the keiretsu-as the meta-firm, the object of our study.50 In the United States,
we would typically view these as separate firms that interconnect only via
contract. Americans would define the "firm" as including only the wholly-owned
subsidiaries of the core firm; GM's Fisher body plant and EDS's computer
operation-once separate companies-would now be seen as part of a single,
GM firm.

Although about 50% of the stock in large Japanese firms is held by banks
and insurers, often in large blocks, other corporations own about 25% of the
large-firm stock. Often these other firms have supplier-customer relations.
Banks and insurers are not the only large block stockholders: steelmakers, for

example, own blocks of the leading automakers, their customers.52 This is our
point of departure: although we do not need to displace the bank monitoring
theories, focusing on bank monitoring alone could blind us to a potentially

critical feature of the Japanese ownership structure. We hypothesize that fostering
relational contracting is the function of the one-third of corporate cross-ownership
not held by the banks.

48. Japanese keiretsu are of two general types, vertical and horizontal (or intermarket). Vertical keiretsu
comprise suppliers, distributors and capital providers of an industry-specific manufacturing concern. In contrast,

horizontal keiretsu include a number of manufacturers across different industries, a trading company, a large

bank, and insurance companies. Some vertical keiretsu overlap with horizontal keiretsu. See Michael Gerlach,

Alliance Capitalism: The Social Organization of Japanese Business 12-13 (1992) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with authors); Ulrike Schaede, Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Investors, Management
Monitoring and Corporate Stakeholders (Aug. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (developing
typology for distinguishing between the two forms of groups).
49. To be sure, two-thirds of the cross-ownership would be held by financial institutions, but because
the financial institutions are partly owned (although at a lower level) by industrial companies, we could
exaggerate and make the financial institution transparent as a gateway for industrial cross-ownership.
50. In so doing we pass over a core problem in the theory of the firm: defining the object of inquiry.
One might conceive of a theory of the firm as encompassing three questions: 1) what is the firm, that is,
how do we define the boundary between market and hierarchy?; 2) what is the efficient boundary of the
firm, that is, given that we know a firm when we see one, what activities should be undertaken within it'?;
and 3) how are decisions made and monitored within the firm?, that is, the traditional corporate governance
problem. It is interesting to note that although the second and third questions plainly depend on the answer
to the first, the vertical integration and corporate governance literatures-responses to the second and third
questions-are far more developed than efforts to understand the first. For example, is Silicon Valley a firm'?

In this Article, we assume the answer to the first question: the firm relevant to our inquiry is the keiretsu.
51. Futatsugi, supra note 9, at 17.
52. Id. at 18.

This content downloaded from 140.247.230.88 on Mon, 20 Mar 2017 20:19:52 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

884 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 102: 871

We offer only a model, not a rich, institut

keiretsu structures. As with any model, ours c

to highlight the importance and operation of a complex system, we must
necessarily make simplifying assumptions.

A. A Stylized Model of the Japanese System
1. The Continuum: Contract Versus Organization

Imagine factors of production for a product-say, five parties consisting
of a distributor, two parts suppliers, a bank, and an assembler-which sit down

to negotiate a cooperative structure for producing the good.53 Efficient
production requires all the parties to make substantial investments in relation-

specific capital. Labor at the assembly firm must learn flexible production
methods and skills peculiar to this enterprise and its team of coworkers.54 The

suppliers have to locate their production close to the assembler. They must
develop, with the assembler, design and quality standards and procedures and
a just-in-time delivery system, all specific to the parties and the product. The
assembler, in turn, must invest jointly with the parts suppliers in the development

of standards and procedures and, in turn, must specialize its assembly facilities
for the suppliers' parts. Finally, the supplier of capital assures that short-term

swings in the business cycle do not leave the venture short of funds, insuring
against the business cycle for those who cannot diversify their relation-specific
investments.55 But the benefits of relation-specific investment come with a cost:

once a factor so invests, the other factors could appropriate the gains from
cooperation. The industrial organization challenge, then, is to design a structure
that provides the parties incentives to make the optimal investment in relationspecific assets. Efficiency requires loose, long-term, relational investments, which
create the risk of opportunism. Maximizing productive efficiency and minimizing
opportunism are the goals of contractual governance.
But what type of arrangement will maximize efficiency and minimize
opportunism? The continuum of possible structures is anchored by two extremes,
one pure contract, the other pure organization. On the idealized contractual end
of the continuum, one factor becomes the entrepreneur and uses highly specific
contracts to organize production; these contracts specify the terms on which
the entrepreneur can acquire goods and services from the other factors under

53. Our stylized model most closely resembles a vertical keiretsu. There are, however, substantial intrakeiretsu purchases and sales even within an intermarket, horizontal keiretsu. See infra note 70.
54. See AoKI, A SYSTEM OF ATTRIBUTEs, supra note 8, at 8; HIDESHI ITOH, JAPANESE HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF INCENTIVE THEORY (Center for Economic Policy Research, Stanford

University Working Paper No. 258, 1991) (reviewing economic structure of Japanese employment patterns);
SHEARD, supra note 44, at 24-26.

55. See, e.g., SHEARD, supra note 44, at 21-24.
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all possible future circumstances, thereby preve

opportunistically. Every contingency is anticipat
contract, whose terms will be judicially enforced without significant friction.
This "firm" is a loose connection of factors that are linked through a nexus of

arm's-length contracts. On the idealized organizational end of the continuum,
few arm's-length contracts are specified: the entrepreneurial factor buys up, or
establishes by itself, the other factors. This firm vertically integrates.
These two idealized extremes capture much of the tension that has motivated

American academic debate over contractual governance. Limited foresight and
the threat opportunism presents to relation-specific investment render neoclassical

contracting incapable of providing a complete structure for organizing production.
Perfect contractual governance is impossible. But the other extreme, vertical
integration, presents its own problems. Organizing production solely within a
firm increases the capital and managerial expertise required and creates the BerleMeans problem. The substitution of ownership for market procurement-making
rather than buying-requires effective internal incentives and monitoring to avoid
organizational opportunism.

2. Japan. A Hybrid Between Contract and Organization

Our model puts the Japanese keiretsu in the middle of the continuum, a
region that has received inadequate attention in the American corporate

governance debate.58 Partial vertical integration through partial cross-ownershi
combined with market contracting, incorporates features of both contract and
organization.

Suppose our factors of production seek to avoid both the bounded rationality
that limits neoclassical contracting and the agency costs that limit corporate
governance. They deliberately use an open-ended relational contract-one

committing the parties to a long-term affiliation for the production of the good

but consigning to the parties' good intentions the way in which the terms of
trade for relation-specific assets will respond to unexpected changes in
conditions. Kester, for example, describes the basic agreement between supplier

56. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC LNSTIuTTIONS OF CAPITALISM 69 (1985).
57. See Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119,
120 (1988); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriabl
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978).

58. The lack of attention to intermediate forms of organization in the United States may reflect th
character of production during the debate. As Piore and Sabel show, the pattern of U.S. manufacturing pr
to 1980 stressed specialized machinery and unspecialized labor as a means of creating and exhausting sca
economies in a period of relative economic calm. PIORE & SABEL, supra note 30, at 27. Intermediate solutio
work well where greater numbers of products produced, and lower product life-spans, increase returns from
flexible human-capital investment yet decrease economies of scale resulting from specialized machinery

See Aoki, Toward an Economic Model, supra note 8, at 7-10.

59. On this point, our strongest precursor is Kester. KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS, supra note 8, a

80-81. Some of what seem to American eyes to be corporate governance matters are really corporat

arrangements that facilitate relational contracting.
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and assembler in the Japanese auto industry: "The buyer and seller will operate

on a basis of mutual respect for each other's autonomy and undertake to establish
and maintain an atmosphere of mutual trust in business dealings."60
While this intermediate solution has the surface appeal of steering a course
between the Scylla of neoclassical contracting and the Charybdis of vertical

integration, without more, the covenant of future good faith is illusory. What
assures the factor providers that one of them will not take advantage of the others

tomorrow when exploitation is possible? In the absence of an effective barrier
to opportunism, the corrosive effect of anticipated misbehavior will cause midrange solutions to devolve into either vertical integration or short-term
61

contracting.
Cross-ownership of equity among factor providers-a central feature of the
Japanese system-helps reduce this opportunism.62 Suppose that in our
hypothetical organizational design problem, each of the five factor providers
supports its investment in relation-specific assets by exchanging equity interests

so that each owns twenty percent of the other four.63 In this setting, the crossholdings help enforce the commitment to a good faith determination of new
terms of trade for relation-specific assets following the occurrence of an

unexpected state of the world. Cross-ownership prevents the party having the

chance to act opportunistically from doing SO.64 With stock ownership, the other

60. KESTER, GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 19. This mode of contracting is not limited to the automobile
industry. Kester refers more generally to claims "that a typical Japanese contract does not even state definitely
the transactions at stake so as not to restrict the flexibility considered necessary for good performance." Id.
at 19 n.7. Similarly, Akio Morita, chairman of Sony, explains that all Japanese contracts contain a provision

to the effect that "in the event of disagreement, both parties to the contract agree[] to sit down together in
good faith and work out their differences." Akio Morita, Do Companies Need Lawyers? Sony's Experiences
in the United States, 30 JAPAN Q. 2, 3 (1983).
61. Note how closely the description of Japanese contracting parallels Oliver Williamson's description

of the simple form of contract that would suffice in a world in which opportunism was somehow impossible:
"A general clause, to which both parties would agree, to the effect that 'I will behave responsibly rather

than seek individual advantage when an occasion to adapt arises'...." Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 241 (1979). See generally

Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 5 (1985). For an effort

to understand barriers to opportunism in dealings between Japanese firms, see Ronald J. Gilson, Value
Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 308-10 (1984).

62. This protection is a hybrid of spontaneous and intentional governance techniques, that is, invisible
hand techniques as well as a conscious contractual protective governance structure. See Oliver Williamson,
Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 159 (1991) (Special

Issue). The literature also contains models of spontaneous techniques falling on both the neoclassical
contracting and organizational ends of the continuum. See Drew Fudenberg, Bengt Holmstrom & Paul
Milgrom, Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships, 51 J. ECON. THEORY 1 (1990)

(succession of short-term contracts is equivalent of first-best long-term contract); David Kreps, Corporate
Culture and Economic Theorv, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLiTICAL ECONOMY 90-143 (James E. Alt

& Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990) (corporate reputation model). We do not consider these models here.
63. We recognize that (1) Japanese cross-ownership rarely rises above 5%; (2) the keiretsu groupings
have more than five members; and (3) there are public stockholders. We use five members and 20% to
simplify the model, not to describe the typical cross-ownership in Japan.

64. One also might formulate the arrangement as a means of enforcing an ex ante risk sharing agreement,
in effect assuring that any good fortune is shared among the participants. See SHEARD, supra note 44, at
13-14.
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factors could coalesce to replace the opportunistic factor provider's managers,
or threaten to sell the stock, which would leave the recalcitrant managers without
"protection" from market havoc (or even a takeover).65 So long as partners
making a relation-specific investment do not expect any one party systematically
to be advantaged over time-that is, the expectation of states favoring a factor
is random-cross-holdings of equity help to support long-term productive
exchange, reducing the opportunism of neoclassical contracting and the agency
costs of vertical integration.66
The critical insight of our stylized model of the Japanese system is that
equity serves a larger purpose than in the Berle-Means corporate governance
model. In the Berle-Means corporation, equity has governance rights because

the holder of the residual profits interest has the best incentive to reduce agency
costs; the right to control rests with those who stand to gain the most from

efficient production.67 In contrast, in our Japanese model, a big slice of equity
serves not just to encourage monitoring through ownership of the residual profits
interest, but also to encourage relation-specific investment by reducing
opportunism as well.68

Traditional main bank monitoring can be reconfigured to fit this system.
Creditors may invest through long-term relation-specific loans just as steelmakers
will invest in a car factory by investing in machinery and at locations most useful
for auto steel; both the creditor and the steelmaker will take stock positions in
the automaker. An automaker that behaves badly will induce bank intervention.
This may appear as American-style intervention of the residual equity holder
to some, but we believe that the relationship is more complex, because it is

65. Dumping stock seems to be the implicit threat in Japan. See Roe, supra note 10.

66. In this regard, our model is similar to that of Berglof & Perotti, supra note 44; see also WILLIAMSON

supra note 56, at 158-59; Gary P. Pisano, Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence fr

the Biotechnology Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 109 (1989). However, we extend the insight, a
informally, to include a determination of what substantive arrangement is enforced-hard work
shirking-and the market circumstances necessary for the technique's success. See infra Part III(B)(1
67. As one of us stated 10 years ago:
[The] description of shareholders as the "owners" of the corporation does not suggest that [their]
role . .. flows, normatively, from their "ownership." It derives, rather, from the need for those
holding the residual interest in corporate profits to have the means to displace management which
performs poorly.... [T]his position is based on matters other than a preconception of the rights
associated with "ownership"; indeed, if the statute did not provide for shareholders we would
have to invent them.

Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender
Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 834 n.56 (1981); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting
in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems
and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983); Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 267 (1988).

68. Note that this treatment of the Japanese system contemplates the crisis intervention role that Aok
and Sheard assign the main bank. See supra text accompanying note 43. In particular, our model assumes
not only the familiar fact that main banks will own blocks of stock in their large borrowers, but also tha
the large borrowers will in turn own stock in the bank to assure that the bank does not behave opportun
istically. This latter assumption appears to be consistent with the facts. For example, Sumitomo Bank is
the largest lender to 11 of its 21 largest corporate shareholders and is a major lender in most other case
Importantly, these borrower-shareholders control some of the bank's stock. Roe, supra note 10.
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deeply embedded in a system of contractual governance. The bank may deal
with an opportunistic portfolio company. It does so, however, not just to
maximize the returns of the residual equity holder-the American model-but
also to protect the bank as a factor of production and provider of credit, and
to protect the other industrial factors, in which the bank is a stockholder.
Even bank crisis intervention or actions as an ongoing monitor are partly

acts of contractual governance, occurring in two dimensions. First, the bank is
protecting its loan position, just as the steel company protects its long-term
investment in machinery tailored to a customer's needs. Second, the bank, as
an owner of stock in the related factors, is acting as their "agent." Main bank

monitoring is not precisely analogous to monitoring by the residual equity holder,
even when the bank is the residual equity holder, because the bank is also a

factor provider and owns stock in other factor providers. The factor providers
receive their returns on investment from the terms on which they provide their
input, not just from the residual performance of the collective enterprise.69 In
the Berle-Means model, corporate governance serves to assure that someone

has the right incentives to monitor. In our stylized Japanese model, corporate

governance serves to support contractual exchange. The multiple relationships-stockholder and creditor, stockholder and supplier-increase the
incentives to intervene (by bundling up two advantages in the relationship) and
decrease the costs (information flows through supplier contacts and stockholder
contacts) when a related firm has problems.70

69. See infra text accompanying note 105.

70. A similar theme is developed in Ito, Nezukuka Nihon-Ban M&A-M&A to Kabushiki Mochiai-no
Honshi Tsu, Kin-yu, Dec. 1989; see Michael Gerlach, Business Alliances and the Strategy of the Japanese
Firm, CAL. MGMT. REV., Fall 1987, at 126, 133 (cross-holdings "create a structure of stable, mutual
relationships among trading partners"); KESTER, GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 26 (cross-holdings "'cement'
business relationships among companies and serve as indicators of mutual long-term commitments").

Our model assumes complete cross-holdings and virtually complete intra-group trade. The reality is
much less extreme. With respect to cross-holdings, Kester reports the percentage of reciprocally owned shares
in the six intermarket keiretsu as follows:
Mitsui group 18.0%

Mitsubishi group 25.3%
Sumitomo group 24.5%
Fuyo group 18.2%
DKB group 14.6%

Sanwa group 10.9%
Id. at Exhibit 6 (1987 data). However, if the denominator is limited to the total shares held by the top 20
shareholders in a company, the percentage of reciprocally owned shares increases substantially:
Mitsui

55.2%

Mitsubishi 74.2%
Sumitomo 68.8%
Fuyo

49.2%

DKB

42.3%

Sanwa

32.8%

Gerlach, supra, at 133 (Table 1). Additionally, large bank borrowers appear to own stock in their main banks.
With respect to intragroup sales and procurement, Kester reports average intragroup sales among all
group industrial companies in 1981 as 20.4% (29% among original zaibatsu groups) and average intragroup
procurement as 12.4% (18.6% among original zaibatsu groups), with a variance of between 8% and 30%.

KESTER, GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 17, Exhibit 4. Gerlach notes that such figures may understate actual
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3. Illustration: General Motors and Fisher Body
An example from America's vertical integration literature will illustrate our

model.71 In 1919, GM needed auto bodies. Fisher Bodies needed a customer
for its auto bodies. To build the kind that GM needed, Fisher had to invest in
specific body-building assets. Fisher was unwilling to do this without assured

purchases from GM. Without contract protection, GM could threaten to abandon
Fisher once Fisher built the GM-specific plants unless Fisher lowered its price,
making the GM-specific assets worthless. Once Fisher made the specific
investments for GM auto bodies, GM could squeeze Fisher's price down to its
variable costs (plus the value of Fisher's assets that could be redeployed away
from GM's bodies). To protect Fisher, GM agreed to purchase its requirements
of the specific body type for ten years from Fisher. This agreement opened up
GM to the risk of exploitation by Fisher: GM was making an openended
commitment to buy its requirements of the specified auto body only from Fisher.

What would stop Fisher from raising its price? Price might be specified in a
contract, but over ten years costs could change, making a specified price
impossible. So, to protect GM, Fisher agreed to a formula by which the price
would be calculated at Fisher's variable costs plus 17.6%, with the 17.6%

presumably representing the expected value of the specific assets to which Fisher
was committing.

An unexpectedly rapid run-up in demand for the specified type of auto

bodies made it worthwhile for Fisher to exploit the contract's formula to hold

up GM. The unexpected run-up in demand for Fisher-type bodies made it
worthwhile (from an integrated perspective) for Fisher to build new capitalintensive plants and locate them next to GM, but Fisher refused to do so and
wanted to be paid under the contract formula. With expanded demand, capitalintensive plants would have been cheaper than the labor-intensive means Fisher

used, but capital-intensive production disfavored Fisher under the contract.
Eventually GM solved its problem by buying up all of Fisher's stock.
In our abstract model, Fisher's unexpected ability to exploit GM might have
been mitigated by extensive cross-ownership. Fisher would have been 5% owned
by GM, 5% owned by a steel firm, 5% owned by an automotive paint and fabric
firm (DuPont), and 20% owned by a coalition of banks, one of which would

have been a "main bank" for this network. In such a setting, Fisher could not

have readily exploited the unexpected loophole because a coalition of owners
could displace Fisher's senior management. Ex ante, GM and Fisher might not

intragroup sales and procurement by excluding transactions within vertical groups inside the intermarket
keiretsu. Gerlach, supra note 48, at 12-13, 185-91.

71. We draw this example from Benjamin Klein's description. See Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration
as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. &

ORG. 199, 200-02 (1988).
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have even bothered with the detail they put
ex post turned out to be insufficiently detailed.

The end result for the GM-Fisher Body problem was complete vertical
integration, raising a serious problem for our model: why is vertical integration
not a general solution for investments in relation-specific assets? Shouldn't the

factors always choose vertical integration-complete, not partial ownership-as
the full solution?

We take this point seriously and do not have a complete answer. Our
hypothesis-suggested by GM's subsequent history-is that something else must
be traded off. First, complete vertical integration raises the agency problems
of large organizational structures, requiring costly investments in internal
monitoring. GM's bloated bureaucracy and recent poor performance may be

the result of "excess" vertical integration. Second, the cross-holding/crossexchange structure differs from complete vertical integration. There is some
resort to contract. The trading relationship between members of even a vertical

keiretsu is not exclusive. The Japanese corporate governance system is said to
be

an attempt to secure the best of two worlds. By tying themselves to
one another in groups, yet eschewing outright ownership and control,
Japanese corporations have been able to exploit some of the
high-powered incentives of the market that derive from independent
ownership of assets, while relying on selective intervention by key

equity owners to adapt contracts to new circumstances as needed.72
The ability of even the completely vertically integrated firm to use outside
suppliers to test the internal division somewhat weakens the distinction. If the
internal division does not measure up, it can be disbanded. One weakness of
complete vertical integration, however, is that if the relational failure goes the

other way-the division performs, but the enterprise as a whole slackens-the

division cannot easily detach itself from the slackers and migrate to a highperformance company.73 With keiretsu partial cross-ownership, that kind of
migration-and the incentives it provides others in the organization-is
possible.74

72. KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS, supra note 8, at 80. Roe argues that the Japanese cross-ownership
flattens authority in the large firms compared to the hierarchical pyramid in the large American firm. Flat
authority may sometimes perform better than a pyramid of authority. See Roe, supra note 10.
73. There is surprising mobility from one keiretsu to another. See Roe, supra note 10.
74. We do not for our purposes here need to identify and quantify the exact value of hybridization of
contract and organization in Japan. It is indeed possible that the difference is one of form (although we doubt
it), arising solely from the Japanese ban on pure holding companies after World War H. For present purposes
we only claim that the Japanese form is a hybrid between contract and organization, which may have some
efficiency advantages.
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B. But What About Monitoring? Product Market Competition as the Catalyst
that Makes the Hybrid Work

Our stylized model of the Japanese corporate system, in which cross-holdings
of equity serve to support exchange rather than to provide incentives for

minimizing agency costs, is not yet complete. By reducing opportunism, crossholdings may support the investment in relation-specific assets necessary to
efficient production. Acquisition of these assets, however, will not guarantee
efficient production. Even an optimal amount of relation-specific assets must
be effectively employed. And here, the skeptic will remark, is where the
contractual governance model falls short. Monitoring-a corporate governance
system directed at reducing agency costs-could still be necessary to assure

that those in charge of employing the relation-specific assets work hard enough
to maximize the return on investment. Without it, the cooperative arrangement
supported by cross-holdings may cease to support efficient production, instead

deteriorating into a cooperative arrangement to protect a collective decision by
the various factor providers to live the good life: I won't monitor you if you
won't monitor me.75
In the corporate governance model, monitoring is conducted, albeit
imperfectly, by the residual owners. And in the absence of an alternative to a
residual owner at the center of the corporate governance model, a contractual
governance model also will not work. Thus, the contractual governance model
we have proffered could lead to everyone working hard or no one working hard,
or any point in between. Understanding the success of the Japanese model

requires that we understand what helps prevent cooperative shirking.76
1. Competition as Catalyst
The most elegant monitoring mechanism is intense product market
competition. We hypothesize that product market competition and relation-

specific investment could interact to generate a powerful monitoring structure.

75. Coffee makes a similar point:
[Tihe very structure of the keiretsu seems designed to ensure weak monitoring. Because the main
bank holds an ownership level that is below five percent by definition, it must secure the consent
of its fellow keiretsu members before it can take disciplinary action or remove senior management.
Yet these other members share a common interest in restricting main bank interventions in the
internal affairs of each member to occasions in which the demonstrated delinquency of a member
firm threatens the keiretsu as a whole.
Coffee, supra note 29, at 1300.
As developed in the remainder of this section, the critical issue is identifying why the structure of the
keiretsu does not ensure weak monitoring.

76. One of us encountered the multiple equilibria problem years ago when he left his two daughters
home without a babysitter for the first time. The children were told that each would babysit the other, the

parents assuming that a monitoring equilibrium would result. As the children later recounted, almost
immediately after the parents left, one child asked the other if she could have a sweet. The other child
answered in the affirmative and made a reciprocal request-a shirking equilibrium.
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Each factor provider has made a substantial r

must bear a substantial nondiversifiable risk in
if the joint effort does not succeed in the product market. Thus, competition
with producers outside the keiretsu gives each factor provider an incentive to
perform effectively.77 Additionally, the joint character of the production creates
an incentive for factor providers to cross-monitor each other as a check on free
riding. Because a joint product's success in the product market depends on the

quality of each factor, each provider's relation-specific investment is hostage
to each of the other's performance; shirking by any factor provider endangers
all. Each factor provider, therefore, has an intense interest in the other providers'
performance.

Product market competition, then, gives each factor provider an incentive
both to perform and to monitor the others' performance. In addition, the factor
providers occupy a unique informational position. Because each factor monitor
is also a producer with relational contacts, it need not invest significant new
resources in information when acting as monitor: It already knows (or almost
knows) what the target is doing by interacting in the production process. Joint
production-of information and goods-yields factor providers real time

information about their co-venturers' performance. A factor provider using

another provider's parts quickly identifies any decrease in quality. Similarly,
a just-in-time inventory system, while economizing on storage space and capital
costs, also measures factor performance on a daily basis; the supplier's or

assembler's inability to perform quickly becomes apparent.78 Moreover, an
opportunist seeking to shirk at a supplier's expense cannot capture the full benefit

of its opportunism; because it owns a slice of the supplier's stock, it will bear
some of the cost, thereby reducing opportunistic incentives. Finally, the
movement of executives among factor providers, said to be commonplace within
the keiretsu,79 also provides for monitoring.
In our model, these aspects of the Japanese system do not exist for the
primary purpose of monitoring by the residual owner, although that monitoring

may help them survive.80 Rather, cross-ownership and contractual relations
facilitate monitoring if competition in the product market provides the incentive
to monitor. In this view, monitoring is not only an intermittent phenomenon,

carried out by a board of directors or even a financial intermediary when the
situation so deteriorates that those at the top of the structure learn of the crisis.

77. It is a familiar pattern in the principal-agent literature that an agent must bear nondiversifiable risk
to create an incentive, but that the very act of creating the incentive shifts risk to an inefficient bearer.
78. We realize that much just-in-time production often involves delivery by smaller, closely held firms

to larger publicly held firms. In such a relationship, the smaller supplier probably does not own stock in

the assembler.

79. See Gerlach, supra note 48, at 173-74.
80. The just-in-time inventory system, for example, is said to have been a response to the 1973 energy
shock. See Takao Komine, Structural Change of Japanese Firms, 19 JAPAN J. ECON. STUD. 79, 80 (1991).
Similarly, cross-ownership increased to prevent takeovers. See infra text accompanying notes 93-95.
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Instead, inter-factor monitoring is woven into the fabric of production.81 Put
differently, product market competition and relation-specific investment transform

the production process into a low cost monitoring process. Joint production yields
information about performance, and thus performance monitoring.
Thus, product market competition is central to our stylized model of the
Japanese system as one of contractual governance.82 In the presence of

competition, the system encourages investment in relation-specific assets which,
in turn, provides both the incentive and the information for inter-factor
monitoring. Centralized monitors, such as a board of directors or, as we will
argue shortly, even a financial institution, cannot always get this information
as quickly.83
This critical role of product market competition to the success of the

Japanese contractual governance model suggests a means of testing our stylized
model's consistency with observed facts. For our model to be consistent with

the actual Japanese system, superior Japanese industrial performance should
depend on the presence of product market competition rather than on the
existence of a few dominant companies: Japanese companies should succeed
internationally in industries with substantial competition and fail in industries
when competition is less vigorous. This appears to be the case. Michael Porter

reports that "[v]irtually every significant industry in which Japan has achieved
international competitive advantage is populated by several and often a dozen

or more competitors."84 The converse is also true: "While domestic rivalry
is intense in virtually every industry in which Japan is internationally successful,

81. Professors Aoki and Sheard also stress the importance of monitoring as a byproduct of a primary
commercial relationship in connection with main bank crisis monitoring. They note that a company's main
bank also carries its principal payment settlement accounts, the primary method of payment for intercompany
transactions in Japan. By observing levels in these accounts, the bank can monitor day-to-day cash flows
of bank borrowers, including their dealings with suppliers and distributors. See Aoki, Ex Post Monitoring,
supra note 43; Aoki & Sheard, supra note 43.
82. Some have observed that in the American corporate governance system, product market competition
may substitute for the market for corporate control in providing an incentive for efficient performance. Of

the companies that proposed dual class recapitalizations, which, by placing absolute voting control in the
hands of management or a dominant shareholder group, eliminated the influence of the market for corporate
control, over half were relatively young companies in fast growing markets with negative cash flows-that
is, companies facing strong product market competition. See Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common
Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 824-32 (1987); Kenneth Lehn, Jeffry Netter &
Annette Poulsen, Consolidating Corporate Control: Dual-Class Recapitalizations Versus Leveraged Buyouts,
27 J. FIN. ECON. 557 (1990) (empirical test of Gilson hypothesis).

83. We do not mean that inter-factor monitoring is always faster. Inter-factor monitoring of serious
breaches will require transmission up through the factor's organization to the board (or its equivalent). Then

that board-or senior management-will deal with the breaching factor's senior management. This
transmission will, we suppose, usually be as slow as the board's monitoring of internal problems. The
difference we see is that sometimes inter-factor monitoring is faster and transmission up to the board is
unnecessary. The assembler's mid-level foreman sees bad parts and tells the supplier's mid-level foreman
that the rejection rate is rising, leading the supplier to investigate and change. No one contacts any board
of directors.

84. MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 411-12 (1990). We realize that
competition could directly spur superior performance, without going through the organizational mechanisms
we model here.
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however, it is all but absent in large sectors of the economy.... Almost none
of these . . . industries ha[s] ever achieved international success."85

2. Vertical and Horizontal Keiretsu: Helping to Explain Some Performance
Differences

Taxonomists divide Japanese keiretsu into vertical and horizontal types. Our
contractual governance story best fits the vertical keiretsu, in which companies
tend to be related, such as suppliers to an end-producer. Companies in the
horizontal keiretsu are more often unrelated, with looser supplier-customer
relations. Since there is cross-selling even in the horizontal keiretsu, however,
our story has a role to play there as well.

Our contractual governance model could also help explain a recurrent puzzle
among those observing the large Japanese firm: the new firms of the vertical
keiretsu-sometimes called the independents-have slightly better measures

of performance than the old-line horizontal keiretsu.86 Some might suggest
that the banks' role is detrimental. This does not seem to be so, however, since
banks' blocks of independents' stock are slightly larger than their old-line
keiretsu blocks.87 Differing main bank ownership levels cannot explain the
slightly different performance levels. One explanation is that vertical keiretsu

are new firms in new, initially profitable industries and have not yet reached
their long-run equilibrium. Another is that the vertical independents have had
families with significant ownership stakes-the Toyoda family in Toyota, the
Matsushita family in Matsushita, Akio Morita in Sony. Family ownership and
financial ownership give these firms two hierarchical monitors.

We offer a third explanation. These independents are not free-standing
corporations, like GM or IBM. As members of vertical keiretsu, consisting

primarily of companies in related industries, suppliers and customers,88 they
should exhibit the productive features we examine here better than old-line
horizontal keiretsu. With completely unrelated keiretsu firms, monitoring would
be slower, from the top, not rapid as among related production factors. Vertical
keiretsu should provide more rapid monitoring. Thus in our story, vertical
keiretsu have three strong brands of monitoring: top-down by institutional
shareholders, top-down by family shareholders (sometimes), and across
companies via contracting. Old-line companies will be weaker in the third. The

85. Id. at 413. Komine also stresses the importance of domestic competition to Japan's international
success. Komine, supra note 80, at 82-84. For our purposes, it matters little whether the competition is
domestic or international, as Japanese firms seek export markets and must compete. The point is th
competition activates the model, pushing the firms away from mutual protection of slothfulness.
86. See Coffee, supra note 29, at 1301.
87. See Roe, supra note 10, at app.
88. See Gerlach, supra note 48, at 12-13.
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strengthened form of contractual governance in
their slightly superior performance.
3. Is Competition Enough?

If competition triggers good performance in the keiretsu and reduces
shirking, the next question a skeptical reader might ask is, why isn't competition

enough? Why wouldn't competition without cross-ownership induce superior
performance?

To a large extent, of course, it does. Firms losing customers eventually react.
Some slower reacting firms disappear. We have no way of measuring how much
competition acts directly and how much it acts through the organizational

features we analyze. The point, however, is that cross-ownership can speed up
and deepen the organizational changes that competition induces.

A deteriorating firm loses customers. But with many long-lived assets in
place, no particular need to access capital markets, and senior managers who

seek a quiet life in the three years until their retirement, a firm facing only
competitive constraints does nothing. A group of owner-suppliers or ownercustomers, however, is not yet slothful. Such a group wants a shirking firm to
produce quality components for the group. A group of owner-customers has
two incentives to prevent a slothful supplier from deteriorating: first, the group
wants a good component, now; second, it wants to protect the value of its
investment in the decaying firm. Moreover, the group's stock investments gives

it another method to bring about quick change: it can withdraw its purchases

(the pure competitive solution) and it can use its stock to bring about
management changes. It has, in the standard terminology, the options of exit
and voice.89
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE ANALYSIS

The measure of an analytic model is whether it helps us better understand

the world we observe. In this Part, we consider (1) the implications our
contractual governance conception of the Japanese corporate system has for
understanding the main bank's role, (2) the significance of the antitakeover role
of cross-holdings, (3) the public shareholder's role in companies with significant
cross-holdings, and (4) the stability of the Japanese corporate structure. We then
turn to the American corporate governance system. Does this perspective on

Japanese governance help us evaluate current proposals seeking to reform the

89. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY-RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN

FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
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American system by incorporating institutiona
istically Japanese?

A. Implications for Understanding the Japanese Corporate Governance System
1. Understanding the Role of the Main Bank

The Japanese main bank is often seen as a monitoring paragon: solving the

Berle-Means quest to bridge the separation of ownership and control, and
internalizing the market for corporate control by intervening in its client firm's

operations when it detects deterioration in performance that threatens the firm's

economic viability. Our model of a Japanese contractual governance system,
in contrast, allows a more limited role for the bank, as residual owner. It need

not be the first line monitor; factor providers conduct real time monitoring during
the production process.90

This account of main bank monitoring's fit with our model's productionbased monitoring is consistent with Professors Aoki and Sheard's main-bankcentered view of Japanese corporate governance.91 They recently argued that

the main bank operates primarily in financial crisis, giving management and
employees an incentive to perform efficiently: the bank frees management from
capital market discipline and efficient performance frees management from bank

discipline. The mere existence of a coalition of banks with large stockholdings
may motivate managers to avoid a crisis that will trigger bank intervention. In

addition, the cross-holdings among factors of production may help managers

avoid falling behind competitors and the bank action such a lag would
precipitate.

The main bank system has also been heralded as a substitute for takeovers.
We do not challenge the view that institutional influence, if structured properly,
could be a replacement for, or indeed be superior to, takeovers. And by inducing

managerial change, main bank crisis intervention replicates some of takeovers'

desired effects. Also, Japanese managers may work hard to avoid a crisis that
would trigger activity from an otherwise inactive group of stockowning banks,

similar to the serious efforts of some American managers to avoid triggering
a takeover offer. The Japanese managers' goal of keeping banks quiet could
induce good management even without hands-on bank monitoring.

90. Professor Aoki notes that some 400 banks had extended credit to Chrysler at the time of its near
bankruptcy. In the absence of delegated monitoring, no bank had the incentive to gather information necessary
to intervene early. Moveover, an enormous coordination problem impeded capturing the lenders' attention

before disaster was imminent. Aoki, Toward an Economic Model, supra note 8, at 15 n.7. A focused group
of lender-stockholders constantly interacting with Chrysler's senior managers, suppliers, and customers might
have intervened earlier and more effectively.

91. See Aoki, Ex Post Monitoring, supra note 43; Aoki & Sheard, supra note 43.
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That said, we believe that the main bank system has yet to be shown as
a close, proven substitute for much of the 1980's antitakeover activity in the

United States. The U.S. takeover market of the 1980's primarily broke up the
conglomerates of the 1960's and early 1970's, whose principal problem was

not financial peril but the misspending of free cash flow. In contrast, the
Japanese main bank of the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's had little experience in

overseeing the effective utilization of free cash flow. Few Japanese companies
had free cash flow: they were expanding their core business, reinvesting profits
in that core business, and seeking financing for further expansion. In this sense,
the main bank had an easy job; the hard job is only now beginning, as more
large Japanese firms acquire enough cash to be free of dependence on bank
lenders. Whether the banks' dual role-as stockholder of and lender to Japanese
firms-will induce firms to fall less deeply into free cash flow pitfalls remains

as a fuller test of the claim that main banks internalize the market for corporate
control.92 Our point here is not that the main bank failed as cash flow monitor
in Japan; our point is that Japan only now is confronting the problem.
2. Understanding the Significance of Cross-Holdings' Antitakeover Role

Keiretsu cross-holdings are also an antitakeover device.93 Cross-holdings
make an external takeover impossible, and the "possibility of bank takeover"94
is said to substitute for the corporate control market in enforcing managerial

discipline.
Our model treats cross-holdings as a means to prevent one factor provider's

opportunistic behavior following relation-specific capital investment by others.
An external takeover threat has no role in this explanation. What accounts for
the conflict?

Part of the original motivation for cross-holdings was to secure protection

from takeovers. Cross-holdings increased in response to the sale, from 1967
through 1969, of stock in "Kyodo Shoken"-a company established by the
Japanese government to acquire stock held as inventory by financially troubled

brokerage houses. Depressed stock prices and the Kyoda Shoken overhang
created takeover fears. Increased cross-holdings were said to be the response.95
The motivation for acquiring cross-holdings, however, may differ from the

92. Indeed, cross-holdings may have perverse effects when business is, or should be, contracting. First
the presence of free cash flow can reflect reduced product market competition, thereby lowering a barri
to mutually accepted shirking. In addition, customer and supplier shareholders may be more willing to accept
expansion during a business decline than pure shareholders. Perhaps the financial shareholders (banks an
insurers) will intervene in a role approaching a pure Berle-Means monitor, but that is in fact the questio
to be seen.

93. See, e.g., Sheard, supra note 34, at 425; JACK MCDONALD, ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF CROSSHOLDINGS IN JAPANESE COMPANIES (Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Technical Note No.

79, 1991).

94. See Aoki, Toward an Economic Model, supra note 8, at 15.
95. MCDONALD, supra note 93, at 3-4.
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function the holdings came to perform. The
might not be obvious or easy to construct. A catalyst-fear of takeovers-might
have been the impetus for cross-holdings; thereafter, the positive functions were
seen, or survived.
The pattern of contractual governance that our model represents did not
spring forth, fully-formed, at a single point. For example, our model assumes
a production process in which efficiency requires substantial relation-specific

investment by all parties. Both Aoki96 and Piore and Sabel97 associate the
Japanese system's success with a shift in demand, leading to a responsive shift
in the production process that in turn requires greater relational specificity with
respect to both industrial and human capital. Multiple products and shorter
product cycles necessitate flexible production machinery and more flexible,
highly trained workers; the combination leads to relation-specific investment.
It makes little difference, however, why the cross-holdings were acquired; once

the character of the production process began to change in the direction of greater
investment in relation-specific assets by all parties, cross-holdings helped to
support it.
Observers of the American corporate governance system should not be
surprised that environmental change can dramatically alter the governance
function of a corporation's structural features. It is now commonplace to stress
the important role institutional investors, especially pension funds, will play in

future corporate governance; the extraordinary growth in institutional holdings
could, some say, help bridge the separation of ownership and control by reaggre-

gating shareholdings.98 It is clear, however, that a desire to improve corporate
governance did not motivate the growth of pension funds. Rather, that growth

reflects both a post-World War II decision in the United States to provide for
retirement security through private pension funds instead of through an expansion

of Social Security,99 and the substantial tax incentives for individuals to use
pensions for savings.1?? But whatever the original motivation behind the growth
of pension funds in the post-War United States, their present function is central
to the current corporate governance system.
The original motivation for cross-holdings may be beside the point. Our

model hypothesizes what their current economic function may be.

96. Aoki, Toward an Economic Model, supra note 8, at 7-10.
97. PIORE & SABEL, supra note 30, at 223-26.

98. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29; Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 7, at 813-14;
Black, Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring, supra note 7, at 896; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note
7, at 892-94.

99. See WILLIAM GRAEBNER, A HISTORY OF RETIREMENT 215-21 (1980).

100. See, e.g, Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic
Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (1991).
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3. Understanding Japanese Contract

In our view, there may be a more fruitful area of historical inquiry than
Japan's takeover history. We hypothesize that Japan's path of development led
it to rely more on relational cross-investments than on contingent contracts. Our
hypothesis depends on our finding either weak law enforcement or a reluctance

to use the courts. At the turn of the 19th century, when large scale enterprise
became technologically possible, Japan imported key elements of its legal system

from Prussia and France.101 Perhaps the Japanese were reluctant to use the
imported system tenaciously. If so, vertical integration, rather than contract, could

have guided large enterprises. And indeed there were large vertical organizations,
the zaibatsu. Moreover, Japanese culture is said to resist the use of legal

action102 and to resist discussing unharmonious conflict-a discussion that
writing a contingent contract requires. These cultural traits handicap the effective
use of a detailed contract.

If law is weak, then alternatives must be found. The zaibatsu helped, and
after their post-war prohibition, the partial relationships of the keiretsu also help.

An alternative to the bond indenture or hundred-page supply contract is partial
stock ownership.

We posit three contractual problems for modern economies to solve: debt
governance, supply contract governance, and corporate equity governance. In

the United States, a well-developed legal system makes it possible to achieve
passable debt and supply contract governance through explicit contracts.
Although the completely contingent contract is unattainable, a passable
contract-the bond indenture, the loan agreement, the hundred-page supply
contract-can be written and enforced without impinging cultural norms. Two
contractual governance problems are tolerably controlled in America; only viable
corporate equity governance contracts cannot be written.
Contrast Japan. If neither the bond indenture nor the supply contract can
be effective because of the nature of the Japanese legal system or culture, some

mechanism to foster long-term relations must be constructed. In the course of
constructing such a mechanism, Japan also reduces the corporate governance
problem.103

101. KAREL WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER 208 (1991).
102. Id. at 315.

103. This is an economy-of-scale argument. Japan has three contractual governance problems to solve
with cross-ownership. Cross-ownership may have costs, like illiquidity, see Coffee, supra note 29, at 1318-21,
but in Japan the gains are in three dimensions. In America, the costs loom larger, because the gains come
primarily in one dimension.

Without well-developed relational contracting doctrines, enforcement costs may be high in Japan. If
the standard approach is to enforce the four corners of the document without interpretive understanding,
contracting parties may be forced to choose between the rigidities of the four-corners contract and the
looseness of the relational structure. American contract law may give American suppliers and customers
an alternative. We also recognize that these legally-determined results could explain not only the origin of
the cross-holdings, but also part of their continuing rationale.
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4. Understanding the Role of Public Shareholders in Japan

In our model of a contractual governance system, factor providers' shared

control, accomplished through cross-holdings, does not diminish the returns to
any other party. This simple depiction of the system contemplates that only factor

providers are shareholders. In actuality, keiretsu members also have public
shareholders, holding about one-quarter of the stock. This has caused some
commentators to question whether factor providers' demand for higher than

market-clearing wages-growth more than price maximization with the pay-off
to creditor-stockholders in excessive debt-comes at the expense of individual

stockholders.'04
Our model suggests an explanation other than exploitation for the implicit
difference between the value of controlling factor provider shares and the value
of noncontrolling public shares. Shareholders will unanimously favor maximizing
the corporation's share value when separation applies: that is, when the
corporation's decisions affect shareholder wealth only through their impact on
the value of its shares. In our model, however, separation does not apply for
factor providers making relation-specific investment. In order for factor providers

to receive a return that reflects the specificity of their investment, the firm by
definition must maximize something other than share value. Simply put, the
factor providers make an additional investment for which they expect an
additional return, a return not provided by maximizing shareholder return.
An additional step is necessary to complete the argument: noncontrolling
shareholders may well approve of the nonmaximizing behavior. So long as the
"extra" return to factor providers is less than the increased productivity resulting
from the relation-specific investment, noncontrolling shareholders are better off
than if factor providers maximized share value but did not make the investment.
Moreover, if public shareholders hold pieces, directly or indirectly, of each

factor, they will want to maximize aggregate productive efficiency, net of costs
to nonstockholding factors (like employees). Thus, our model suggests that to
demonstrate exploitation of public shareholders requires more than the
observation that keiretsu companies do not maximize share value; it requires

the stronger claim that share value is lower than if the relation-specific
investments were not made at all. In other words, public shareholders are only

104. See, e.g., RYUTARO KOMIYA, THE JAPANESE ECONOMY: TRADE, INDUSTRY, AND GOVERNMENT

167-70, 172-73, 177, 180 (1990); see Coffee, supra note 29, at 1298. Contrary to the commentators, we

believe that the "higher" in higher than market-clearing wages must be judged in terms of productivity. If
"higher" wages yield greater productivity, or are a needed component in a system yielding productivity,

then the "higher" wages may benefit stockholders. We leave pursuit of this analysis for others, who might
begin with George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment,
105 Q.J. ECON. 255 (1990). In the text we generalize this labor productivity argument.
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exploited when they receive no return from the increased productivity resulting

from the factor providers' investment. This showing has yet to be attempted.105
5. Understanding the Stability of the Contractual Governance Model
The familiar account of the Japanese corporate governance system seems

to assume that the implicit contract it describes-assured employment, protected
by cross-holdings from breach by takeover, and monitored by the main bank
to assure viability-is stable. No party will break the covenant because some

unspecified implicit remedy-perhaps reputation-deters it. Our model suggests
a more precise analysis.
In Part III, we described cross-holdings as protecting against opportunism

when, in an unexpected state of the world, fortune randomly sets up a factor
provider with an opportunity to exploit. What happens, however, when an event

occurs that permanently devalues a factor provider's relation-specific investment?
In that circumstance, the factor providers in our model will unfavorably alter
the participation of the unlucky provider. While the coalition will prevent one
lucky factor provider from exploiting the group, it will not protect a single
unlucky provider from the consequences of a long-term shift in fortunes.
This analysis calls into question the claim that American antitakeover

protection (or the Japanese main bank) is necessary to support factor providers'
relation-specific investment. Imagine that a hostile bidder confronts a target
whose factor providers receive a return on relation-specific investment. If
continued relation-specific investment by a particular factor provider is no longer
valuable-that is, if the factor provider's special contribution has been

permanently devalued-the hostile bidder will cut it off. But so will participants
in a contractual governance system. A contractual governance perspective thus
suggests that an implicit contract justification for antitakeover protection requires

more careful specification.106
B. Evaluating Reform Proposals for the U.S. Corporate Governance System
In recent years, the Japanese corporate governance system has captured the

vision of those seeking to reform American corporate governance. Japan appeared

105. Professors Coffee and Ramseyer argue that the main banks' co-insurance role cannot be valuable
to the noncontrolling shareholders "because shareholders can diversify to protect themselves from losses
and so would not want expensive insurance purchased from banks at the price of above-market interest rates."

Coffee, supra note 29, at 1298; see Ramseyer, supra note 38, at 112 n.66. But shareholders ought not to
be the beneficiary of the insurance; it is the other providers of relation-specific investment who are protected.
Shareholders can diversify risk; these providers cannot. Insurance induces the proper level of relation-specific
investment which, in turn, benefits noncontrolling shareholders so long as their share of the productivity
gain from the investment exceeds the above market portion of the interest rate.

106. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European
Corporate Governance Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 101, 129-31 (1992) (providing more detailed
criticism of implicit contract arguments against takeovers).
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to have solved the Berle-Means problem.1
imitations are difficult.'08 We next consider one such reform effort-the LBO
association, said to be arising in the shadow cast by the eclipse of the public
corporation-whose proponents hold out the Japanese system as evidence of

their effort's promise. We also briefly consider the segments of the U.S. economy
identified by our model as potentially suitable recipients of a contractual
governance transplant.
Our model suggests that the Japanese system differs from the LBO

association in its specifics; as a result, it offers less support for the reform eff
than is claimed. It is important to stress, however, that we do not mean to reject

the reforms themselves. Rather, we argue only that the reforms must be justified

by their fit with our system, not by their limited resemblance to a very different
Japanese system.

1. The Keiretsu and the LBO Association
Michael Jensen has advanced the LBO association as a successor to the

public corporation.109 Jensen describes LBO associations as having three
components: (1) a sponsoring partnership that organizes highly leveraged goingprivate transactions and advises and monitors post-transaction target management
on a cooperative and ongoing basis; (2) target company managers who remain

post-transaction and who receive a substantial equity stake to "incentivize" their

performance; and (3) institutional investors who provide the limited partnership

with the debt and equity to make the acquisition.110 These entities, Jensen
argues,

have a fundamental affinity with Japanese groups of firms called
"keiretsu." LBO partnerships play a dual funding and oversight role
that is similar in many ways to that of the main banks in the Japanese
keiretsu. Like the main banks, which typically hold significant equity

stakes in their corporate borrowers, the leaders of the LBO partnerships
hold substantial amounts of equity in their companies and control access
to the rest of the capital. Further like the Japanese banks, the LBO

107. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-8, 66, 189-90, 193-94, 286; Porter, supra note 2
108. See Roe, supra note 10; Coffee, supra note 29, at 1318-19, 1324-27. Roe emphasizes that th
bank as monitor-whether through residual equity-holding or as part of a contractual governance
system-cannot easily be constructed in the United States. Due to historical (and some current) product an
geographic restrictions, American banks are too weak and too small compared to Japanese banks. Depos

insurance is too deeply embedded in the American system; massive bank ownership cannot work well without
solving the problems arising from deposit insurance. But since we have had many more compelling reaso

than corporate governance to solve these deposit insurance problems and have not done so, there is litt
reason to be optimistic about unleashing banking institutions. There are possibilities, Roe argues, for oth
financial institutions. Coffee believes that the current reward systems for institutional fund managers do no
reward superior long-run performance; he believes institutions as currently structured need so much liquidity
that they could not undertake the long-term investments said to be commonplace in Japan.
109. See Jensen, supra note 3, at 61.
110. Id. at68.
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partners are actively involved in the monitorin
of these firms.'11

Finally, like the Japanese banks, the LBO asso
In our view, the LBO and keiretsu have one similarity, but two significant

differences. Jensen identifies the similarity: financial institutions play a large
role in both. One difference, however, is that the Japanese bank's role is

embedded in a deeper system of relational cross-holdings. Industrial companies
with relation-specific investments provide much of the monitoring and one-third

of the cross-ownership in the keiretsu. In contrast, they provide none of the
monitoring or cross-ownership in the LBO. The contractual governance structure

among factors of production, and its dependence on product market competition,
is critical to the keiretsu, but absent in the LBO.113
Secondly, they differ in that the LBO association is best suited to companies
with substantial shares in mature markets that generate free cash flow. This is
precisely the opposite of the product market conditions that, we argue, are critical

to the success of a contractual governance system dependent on new relational
investments, and precisely the opposite of the crisis conditions under which
Professors Aoki and Sheard claim the main bank has so far played its real

role.114 The main bank's active role appears now to be crisis intervention;115
its primary noncrisis role is to hold a large block of stock that will become active
if managers allow a crisis to develop. We do not want to demean the potential
effectiveness of large but usually passive shareholders-as the main banks may
be when their credit-monitoring dissipates-if managers fear their actions may
activate such shareholders."16 But this type of monitoring differs quite substantially from the LBO association's hands-on real time monitoring. In our view,

11 1. Michael C. Jensen, Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer

1991, at 13, 22.

112. Michael C. Jensen, Active Investors, LBOs and the Privatization of Bankruptcy, J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN., Spring 1989, at 35 (statement before House Ways and Means Committee, February 1, 1989); Jensen,

supra note 3, at 73.

113. At least for pre-1986 transactions, the LBO association did appear to privatize bankruptcy.

Transactions occurring after 1985 reflected changes in structure that made such privatization more tenuous.

First, publicly held debt replaced privately placed debt, increasing the negotiating costs of consensual

reorganizations. See Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 236-43 (1987).
Second, strip finance, which mitigated intrafirm bargaining in the event of distress, also declined after 1985;

and, finally, principal payments on senior bank debt were accelerated. See William F. Long & David J.
Ravenscraft, Decade of Debt: Lessons from LBOs in the 1980s, in THE DEAL DECADE (Margaret Blair ed.,
forthcoming 1993); STEVE N. KAPLAN & JEREMY C. STEIN, THE EVOLUTION OF BUYOUT PRICING AND
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE IN THE 1980s (Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business,
University of Chicago Working Paper No. 327, 1991).
114. See supra text accompanying note 43.

115. Id. The reason for the difference in monitoring roles may be found in the source of the power
to monitor; unlike the main bank, which owns no more than 5% of a client company, the LBO association
has absolute voting control over its operating entities.
116. Kester reports semiannual meetings between managers and bankers where the managers report

on recent performance but do not submit budget and future plans to the banks. KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS,

supra note 8, at 194-97.
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the main bank's crisis role is more analogous to that of Warren Buffett's

Berkshire Hathaway-large stakes but major action only in crisis-than to the

LBO association.117 Finally, the amount of stock that the main banks own
appears to be considerably less than the amount the LBO association owns. The

main bank typically owns 5% and can usually put together a small coalition
of other financial institutions that will reach 20% or so. In contrast, the LBO
association frequently owns all of the company's stock.
The point of this analysis is not to enter the debate over Jensen's claim that

the LBO association should replace the public corporation.118 Rather, the point
is that an analysis comparing the LBO and the keiretsu is not directly
illuminating, because such an analysis implicitly relies on the belief that the
Japanese corporate governance system is a response only to the Berle-Means

problem. The LBO association's efficiency as a governance structure depends

on its fit with the American system of weak financial intermediaries, weak crossholdings among factors of production, and strong enforcement of contracts. The

success of the Japanese main bank, which operates in circumstances very

different from those in the United States, only illuminates the American inquiry
to the extent that it suggests that the American system of corporate governance
is not inevitable.

2. Where Might the Japanese Model Provide Guidance?

Though not perfectly transferable, the Japanese contractual governance model

is nevertheless relevant to American problems. Three conditions are central to

our model of contractual governance: a productive relationship among the
participants; the need for relation-specific investment; and the presence of
substantial product market competition. The first condition provides the context;
the second creates the problem; and the third causes the coalition formed by
cross-holdings among factor providers to reject a shared commitment to the quiet
life. America's high technology industry seems an obvious candidate for
contractual governance initiatives. Joint venture and equity participation have

already become familiar,119 and the difficulty of technology transfer makes
relation-specific investment important. 120 Moreover, an established group of
venture capital investors already play roles similar to Japanese main banks, in

particular those of crisis monitoring and privatization of bankruptcy, by

117. Berkshire Hathaway takes large stock positions. While Berkshire's senior managers often become
members of the portfolio companies' boards, their visible activity has been limited to times of crisis, as at
Salomon Brothers after the Treasury bidding scandal.
118. For a rejoinder to Jensen, see Alfred Rappaport, The Staying Power of the Public Corporation,
HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 96.

119. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 56, at 158-59; Pisano, supra note 66.
120. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 56, at 293-94; David J. Teece, Economies of Scope and the Scope
of the Enterprise, 1 J. ECON. BEHAv. & ORG. 223 (1980).
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facilitating a single voice for numerous s
competition among products and between technologies is vigorous.
We realize that high technology is currently one of the American economy's

best performers, for which contractual or corporate governance improvements
may now be unnecessary. Heavy industries-like autos and steel-are in worse

condition and seem to have serious governance problems. Here too our
prescriptions might fit. If each is slow to develop new technologies and
production methods, cross-ownership among relational suppliers might speed

adaptation. So, if new steel technologies-say, the mini-mills-are to be located
near new auto plants having innovative production technologies, cross-ownership
might function in a manner similar to that which we hypothesize for Japan. Each
will double up their interest in the other's prosperity: steel firms will want a
better customer and a better portfolio firm. Information that the firms will gather
about each other while adapting the production process together may make each

a more valuable stockholder to the other. Moreover, competition, which we
hypothesize is necessary to prevent mutual shirking, is today generally present

in both industries (to the extent that import restrictions are not severe).

Our point is neither that the existing organizational structure in high
technology industries mirrors Japanese contractual governance nor that parallel
technological changes in related industries like autos and steel make them ripe
for cross-ownership; we have not undertaken this inquiry, and our views are
not so deterministic. Nor do we claim that American legal, tax, and financial
structures are ready to support cross-ownership. We do suggest, however, that

comparative analysis of the Japanese contractual governance model may lead
to the instrumental use of such a governance structure in the United States,
transplanted to where the structural economic preconditions to successful
domestication are in place.
V. CONCLUSION

Too many efforts to understand the Japanese system have suffered from
Berle-Means blinders. Hidden by the focus on main banks is the fact that

one-third of the cross-ownership is held by industrial companies. 22 We
hypothesize that cross-ownership reduces the risk of opportunism when parties

make large relational investments. The management of any factor that defects,
by trying to raise price inordinately, to skimp on quality, or to miss the next
technological step in the industry, will face a coalition of stockholders. Fear

121. See Christopher B. Barry, Chris J. Muscarella, John W. Peavy III & Michael R. Vetsuypens, The
Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public Companies: Evidence from the Going-Public Process,
27 J. FIN. ECON. 447, 449-51 (1990); William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital
Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 475-87 (1990).

122. This amount increases when one attributes the bank's industrial portfolio to the other members

of the keiretsu.
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of such a confrontation deters defection. Product market competition keeps the

system from lapsing into a conspiracy of passivity.
Industrial cross-ownership has not previously been emphasized as a key
element of the Japanese corporate system, and we believe this connection is
important. Indeed, we suspect that some of the main bank interventions can and
should be seen not just as the pure intervention of the residual equity holder
(or large creditor) to protect its investment-the American model-but as the
intervention of factor providers. The bank monitors directly by providing credit

and indirectly by serving as agent for the other factors. The bank assumes this
agency role partly because of its stock ownership in the other factors.
The existence and persistence of such a system strongly supports the view
that the American system of corporate governance is not inevitable, but is instead
contingent on the accidents of American financial organization and political
history. The newfound activism of some financial intermediaries and the rise
of the LBO association also support this general proposition. But neither the
newly-active intermediary nor the LBO replicates the Japanese system in its
specifics. Finally, although the Japanese system may provide general deterrence
to keep managers faithful, this system has not yet shown itself to be an effective
substitute for the American takeover of the 1980's. The Japanese main banks
have yet to. face the widespread cash flow and conglomerate problems that

pervaded the targets of these takeovers. The Japanese system tells us generally
that there is more than one way to build a large corporation. It tells us little,
however, about whether and how American financial intermediaries should be
unleashed.
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